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T USTICE requires, to the extent possible, simplification of a trial
to the relevant disputed issues. In Hickman v. Taylor' pretrial
discovery was described as a device for narrowing and clarifying the
basic issues between the parties and ascertaining the facts, or infor-
mation as to the existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those
issues. In United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,' Mr. Justice Doug-
las stated: "[M]odern instruments of discovery serve a useful pur-
pose .... They together with pretrial procedures make a trial less
a game of blind man's buff and more a fair contest with the basic
issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent."' Texas
pretrial procedures afford means of reaching this result.
Texas law provides the practitioner three4 basic discovery tools
other than depositions:' the motion for production of documents,
authorized by rule 167,6 written interrogatories to parties, authorized
* B.A., Texas Christian University; LL.B., LL.M., Southern Methodist University.
'329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
356 U.S. 677 (1958).
"Id. at 682.
4 Stayton, The Scope and Function of Pleading Under the New Federal and Texas Rules:
A Comparison, 20 Texas L. Rev. 16, 18 (1941):
The federal feature of physical and mental examinations of persons has been
omitted. In the original draft of the rules it was included. The opposition to
it before the committees of the Legislature was very strong and threatening.
The court eliminated it. Perhaps not much was lost in view of the present
Texas rule upon the subject which has been established by the decisions. This,
it will be recalled, is, that if a demand for a physical examination is made and
refused, the refusal may be brought out before the jury.
Texas deposition practice is beyond the scope of this Article. See text accompanying
note 11 infra.
6 All references in the text to "rule" refer to Tex. R. Civ. P. unless otherwise stated.
Rule 167 provides:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice to
all other parties, and subject to such limitations of the kind provided in Rule
186b as the court may impose, the court in which an action is pending may
order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photo-
graphing by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers (except written statements of witnesses), books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are
in his possession, custody, or control; or order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose
of inspecting, measuring, surveying or photographing the property or any
designated object or operation thereon which may be material to any matter
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by rule 168,' and requests for admissions of fact, authorized by rule
169.' Each of these discovery devices is designed to serve a different
involved in the action. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of
making the inspection, measurement or survey and taking the copies and
photographs and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just, provided
that the rights herein granted shall not extend to the written communications
passing between agents or representatives or the employees of either party to
the suit, or communications between any party and his agents, representatives,
or their employees, where made subsequent to the occurrence or transaction
upon which the suit is based, and made in connection with the prosecution,
investigation or defense of such claim or the circumstances out of which same
has arisen. (Supp. 1965).
'This rule provides:
At any time after a party has made appearance in the cause, or time therefor
has elapsed, any other party may serve upon such party written interrogatories
to be answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or pri-
vate corporation or a partnership or association, by any officer or agent, who
shall furnish such information as is available to the party. The interrogatories
shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath. The answers shall
be signed by the person making them or by the attorney for the party, and
the party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of
the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within the time
specified by the party serving the interrogatories which specified time shall not
be less than 15 days after the service of the interrogatories, unless the court,
on motion and notice and for good cause shown, enlarges or shortens the time.
Whenever a party is represented by an attorney, service of interrogatories and
answers to interrogatories shall be made on the attorney unless delivery to the
party himself is ordered by the court. True copies of the interrogatories and
of any answers shall be served on all other parties or their attorneys at the
time that any interrogatories or answers are served, and a true copy of each
shall be promptly filed in the clerk's office together with proof of service
thereof under the provisions of Rules 21a and 21b. Within 10 days after
service of interrogatories a party may serve written objections thereto together
with a notice of hearing the objections at the earliest practicable time. An-
swers to interrogatories to which objection is made shall be deferred until the
objections are determined and for such additional time as the court may direct.
Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be inquired into under
Rule 186a, but the answers, subject to any objections as to admissibility,
may be used only against the party answering the interrogatories. Interroga-
tories may be served after a deposition has been taken, and a deposition may
be sought after interrogatories have been answered, but the court, on motion
of the deponent or the party interrogated, may take such protective order
as justice may require. The number of interrogatories or of sets of interroga-
tories to be served is not limited except as justice requires to protect the party
from annoyance, expense, embarrassment, or oppression. The provisions of Rule
186b are applicable for the protection of the party from whom answers to
interrogatories are sought under this rule. (Supp. 1965.)
This rule provides:
At any time after the defendant has made appearance in the cause, or time
therefor has elapsed, a party may deliver or cause to be delivered to any other
party or his attorney of record a written request for the admission by such
party of the genuineness of any relevant documents described in and exhibited
with the request or of the truth of any relevant matters of fact set forth by
the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless
copies have already been furnished. Whenever a party is represented by an at-
torney of record, delivery of a reqeust for admissions shall be made to his at-
torney unless delivery to the party himself is ordered by the court. The request
for admissions must state that it is made under this rule and that each of the
matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless
a sworn statement is delivered to the party requesting the admissions or his
attorney as provided in this rule. Each of the matters of which an admission
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need, while discovery in general is designed to narrow the issues, to
secure known evidence for trial use, to determine the existence of
evidence and how and from whom it may be procured, and to provide
fast, inexpensive and effective means of achieving these salient pur-
poses.
The motion for production of documents, written interrogatories
to parties, and request for admissions of fact are "epistolary"'" dis-
covery devices as opposed to deposition practice, which is con-
frontory. The epistolary discovery devices are less expensive but
frequently, less effective than the confrontory depositions."
is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the
request, not less than ten days after delivery thereof or within such further
time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom the
request is directed delivers or causes to be delivered to the party requesting
the admission or his attorney of record a sworn statement either denying
specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in
detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those mat-
ters. Any admission made by a party pursuant to such request is for the pur-
pose of the pending action only and neither constitutes an admission by him
for any other purpose nor may be used against him in any other proceeding.
A true copy of a request for admissions or of a sworn statement in reply there-
to, together with proof of the delivery thereof as provided in Rule 21a, shall
be filed promptly in the clerk's office by the party making such request or
such sworn statement.
9 Franki, Discovery, 13 Tex. B.J. 447, 482 (1950); also in Tex. R. Civ. P. Ann. 511
(1955).
"o Professor James Wm. Moore apparently originated the use of the term "epistolary"
to describe the written feature of interrogatory practice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 in con-
trast to the oral or confrontory interrogatory under Fed. R. Civ. P. 31. 4 Moore, Federal
Practice 5 31.02, at 2152 (2d ed. 1963). Epistolary is equally descriptive of the three writ-
ten Texas discovery devices.
" See Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 Yale L.J. 863,
874-877 (1933).
Deposition practice is presided over by an officer appointed to take the deposition;
Tex. R. Civ. P. Ann. 194 (Supp. 1965) provides that depositions shall be taken by "officers
authorized to take depositions as set forth in article 3746 of the Revised Civil Statutes of
Texas, 1925, as amended, and Article 2324a .. " The deponent is questioned by the at-
torneys of both parties in a manner similar to examination at trial with the presiding officer
recording the questions and responses. Developments In The Law-Discovery, 74 Harv. L.
Rev. 940, 952 (1961).
Texas deposition practice, which now appears in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure as
rules 176 to 215a, is beyond the scope of this Article. Deposition practice originated as a
form of potential evidence rather than a true discovery device. Franki, Discovery, supra note
7, at 479.
The deposition rules prior to 1957 were designed primarily to "secure potential testimony
from prospective witnesses in such a way that the contents of the deposition can be used
as testimony or in some similar way in a lawsuit." Masterson, Adversary Depositions and
Admissions Under Texas Practice, 10 Sw. L.J. 107 (1956).
In practice the deposition was also used for discovery by agreement of the parties to
waive objections until trial; discovery was a secondary objective and "not clearly recognized
by the rules. New Rule 186a-Scope of Examination-has changed the concept of the stated
purpose of depositions, and now recognizes that depositions may be taken 'for the purpose
of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes.' " Thode, Some Re-
flections on the 1957 Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Pertaining to
Witnesses at Trial, Depositions, and Discovery, 37 Texas L. Rev. 33, 37 (1958). This addi-
tion of rule 186a was declaratory of the evolution under the previous rules. Tex. R. Civ. P.
Ann. 258 (Supp. 1964).
They did not contemplate . . . the discovery in advance of trial of testi-
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The motion for production of documents has as its purpose the
production of relevant, nonprivileged documents and tangible things
in the possession of one party for inspection, copying or photo-
graphing by the movant."
The purpose of interrogatories to parties is to obtain information
within an opposing party's knowledge prior to taking his deposition.
The object of requests for admissions of fact "is to obtain conscious
admissions of uncontroverted matter"'" and thereby simplify and
shorten the trial.
The three discovery devices have certain characteristics in com-
mon. Each is limited to parties,' primarily designed to operate prior
to trial," designed primarily to discover information as opposed to
obtaining evidence," free of geographical limitations such as subpoena
range,' and enforced by sanctions exclusively applicable to parties, 8
mony pertaining to the suit. Nevertheless, in practice the deposition, particu-
larly the oral deposition, was frequently employed as an instrument of dis-
covery. . . . Rule 186a is therefore to a large extent declaratory of what had
come to be the practice under the previous rules.
The scope of examination permitted in a deposition has been broadened by
rule 186a to cover non-privileged matter:
a. which is relevant to the subject involved in the pending litigation
whether it relates to the claim or defense of party;
b. including inquiry into the existence, description, nature, custody, con-
dition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things;
c. including the identity and location of persons having knowledge of rele-
vant facts;
d. even though the testimony elicited is not admissible at trial, if it is
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Thode, supra at 38.
All except provision a. above are " 'fishing' provisions and are a clear recognition by the
supreme court that it is necessary to the administration of justice that the parties be able
to ascertain the facts of the case with the aid of the tools provided by the rules." Ibid.
Sanctions to enforce deposition procedures are primarily contained in rule 215a. The
trial court is provided sanctions to deal with witnesses or parties who refuse to make pre-
trial disclosure by deposition. Among the available sanctions are fines, contempt, completion
of deposition before the court, assessment of additional expenses occasioned by unjustified
refusal, striking such party's pleadings, dismissing the suit, otherwise precluding the presenta-
tion of his grounds for recovery or defense, and rendering default judgment. Sanctions are
invoked by motion and notice and are available prior to trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. Ann. 281-82
(Supp. 1964).
Rule 215a provides that the trial court may enforce deposition procedures by "such
orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and among others, those permitted by Rule 170."
This incorporation of rule 170 by reference into rule 215a coupled with their common
source in FRCP 37 results in many similarities in sanctions available for enforcement.
"Steely and Gayle, Operation of the Discovery Rules, 2 Hous. L. Rev. 222 (1964).
"Subcommittee on Interpretation of Rules of Civil Procedure, Opinion, 5 Tex. Bar J.
124, 125 (1942), 8 Tex. B.J. 3, 11 (1945). (Emphasis in original.)
14 Franki, supra note 9, at 447.
" 3 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice 5 10.02 (1950).
1d. § 10.03.
"Steely and Gayle, supra note 12.
15 Rule 215a sanctions apply to party or witness, while rule 168 interrogatories are limited
to parties. This is one of the many reasons rule 215a sanctions are limited to interrogatories
under deposition practice. See text accompanying notes 109-113 infra.
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except against the state, which enjoys virtually an immune status
from sanctions."9
The basic Texas discovery devices are derived from the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, their respective source rules being the
motion for production of documents, FRCP2° 34, written interroga-
tories to parties, FRCP 33, and requests for admissions of fact,
FRCP 36.
The motion to produce, as originally adopted, was derived directly
from FRCP 34, except that Texas expressly prohibited pretrial dis-
covery of communications or reports incident to handling the case
and entry upon land for inspection.2 The motion to produce was
amended in 1957 with two changes based on the 1948 amendment
of FRCP 34. The first amendment authorized entry on land for in-
spection, measuring, surveying or photographing the property. The
second change expressly provided rule 186b-protection to the answer-
ing party and is in keeping with the FRCP 26(b) provision added
to the source rule."
A major distinction exists between rule 168 interrogatories to
parties and its source FRCP 33. The former may only be used
against the answering party under the Texas practice, whereas the
latter may be used to the same extent as federal depositions."
The request for admissions procedure was adopted from FRCP 36
with minor textual change. FRCP 36 was amended, effective 1948, to
provide a specific method for an answering party to challenge the
propriety of a request and to permit requests for admissions to be
served at any time after commencement of the action' as contrasted
with the rule 169 requirement that appearance must be made prior
to submission of requests.'
"Shirley v. Dalby, 384 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref. n.r.e., motion to
produce; Harrington v. State, 385 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), interrogatories; 2a
Barron and Holtzoff-Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 857 (1961), FRCP 37(f)
expressly exempts the United States from most sanctions under the federal rules. The United
States' immune status has been criticized. Finman, The Request for Admission in Federal
Civil Procedure, 71 Yale L.J. 371 (1962).
In the Harrington case, supra at 417, the states' immunity from interrogatories was
rationalized in this way:
We know of no State official or agent who is authorized to answer interroga-
tories for the State. It is the duty of the Attorney General, under Art. 6036,
to institute and conduct this suit, but he is prohibited by Art. 4411, V.T.C.S.,
from making any admission, agreement or waiver in a suit to which the State
is a party which shall prejudice the rights of the State. The powers of the
Attorney General, thus circumscribed, are not to be enlarged by the courts.
The same principle logically applies as well to production of documents and admissions.
20All textual reference to "FRCP" refer to Fed. R. Civ. P.
2'Tex. R. Civ. P. Ann. 501 (1955).
"Tex. R. Civ. P. Ann. 219 (Supp. 1965).
23 Id. at 226.
4 Tex. R. Civ. P. Ann. 516 (1955).
25Rule 169, supra note 8.
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Wilful refusal to comply with discovery requires the imposition
of sanctions." Sanctions are seldom, if ever, imposed on a party who
has made a good faith attempt to comply with the discovery rules.
Unfortunately, there is a small minority of the bar whose mulish
disposition is to thwart discovery. Discovery devices are only as
good as the willingness of the bar to comply. This accomplishment
necessitates a readiness of the trial courts to enforce the applicable
sanctions.
The Supreme Court of Texas has steadfastly held that Texas courts
have no inherent powers, either at law or in equity, to originate new
processes to aid discovery. The trial courts' authority must be found
in the rules and statutes or in such further powers and jurisdiction
as are reasonably inferred from the powers and jurisdiction granted."
The sanctions provided for refusal to allow discovery " authorize
trial courts to make any just order deemed necessary. Such penalties
25 The text of rule 170 is:
If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an
order made under Rule 167 the court may make such orders in regard to the
refusal as are just, and among others, the following:
(a) an order that the matters regarding the character or description of the
thing, or the contents of the paper, or any other designated facts shall be
taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the
claim of the party obtaining the order;
(b) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing in evidence
designated documents or things or items of testimony;
(c) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further pro-
ceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party.
If a party, after being served with a request under Rule 169 to admit the
genuineness of any documents or the truth of any matters of fact, serves a
sworn denial thereof and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter
proves the genuineness of any such document or the truth of any such mat-
ter of fact, he may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party
to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in making such proof. If in the
course of such a bearing it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that
any party or his attorney is arbitrarily refusing to co-operate in disposing of
questions of fact as to which there is no basis for bona fide controversy, the
court shall tax all expenses of proving such facts, including reasonable at-
torneys fees, against the party refusing to co-operate, subject to review upon
appeal.
27 This Article will not deal with questions of service, verification, failure to answer or
the mechanics of initiating discovery. For discussions, see 2A Barron and Holtzoff-Wright,
Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 761-803, 831-858 (1961); Franki, note 9 supra; Lane,
Rule 169-The judge's Adjutant, 28 Tex. B.J. 183 (1965); Masterson, Admissions, 13 Tex.
B.J. 443 (1950); Masterson, Adversary Depositions and Admissions Under Texas Practice,
10 Sw. L.J. 107 (1956); Spencer, Uses and Abuses of Rule 168-nterrogatories to Parties,
26 Tex. B.J. 919 (1963); and Williams, Pretrial Procedures in the State Courts of Texas,
5 So. Tex. L.J. 261 (1960). Pretrial procedures are found in Tex. R. Civ. P. Ann. § 8
(1955); 3 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, Ch. 10 (1950).
"8Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 149 Tex. 416, 234 S.W.2d 389 (1950); Ex parte
Hughes, 133 Tex. 505, 129 S.W.2d 270 (1939).
29Rule 170, subra note 26.
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are imposed exclusively on the offending party."
The motion to produce has available a wide range of sanctions
for its enforcement, including the following specifically enumerated
sanctions: (1) establishing proponent's claim regarding a fact, con-
tents of a paper, or character or description of a thing; (2) pro-
hibiting support or opposition to a claim or defense, or prohibiting
the introduction of evidence as to certain matters; (3) striking
pleadings; (4) staying proceedings pending compliance with an
order; (5) dismissing all or part of an action; and (6) rendering a
default judgment. 1
The lack of an effective sanction emasculates rule 168 interroga-
tories. The trial court may enter a "just order," but guidelines are
necessary for the effectiveness of rule 168 interrogatories.
The request for admissions lacks a truly effective sanction, which
fact is the primary reason for its slight use." Should improper sworn
denial of a fact be made, the movant must first prove the fact wrong-
fully denied, and then on motion the court is empowered to reim-
burse the movant for expenses incurred, including attorney's fees
incident to the hearing."
II. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND OBJECTS
Trial courts are empowered by rule 167' to order, upon motion,
the production, inspection and copying of private documents con-
taining or constituting nonprivileged evidence material to the action
under a party's control." Characteristics of the motion to produce
not shared by its companion discovery devices are judicial control
from inception, with burden on movant to show that discovery
should be allowed, and availability during trial as well as before.37
To initiate the motion to produce movant files a motion for discov-
ery showing good cause (that it will aid in the preparation of the case)
and relevancy (that the item is material evidence). "The motion
for discovery must be specific, must establish materiality, and must
30Rule 170, supra note 26. Compare rule 215a which provides for penalties against a
witness with FRCP 37 which provides penalties against the recalcitrant advocate.
31 Rule 170(a), (b) and part of c, supra note 26.
"Holtzoff, A Judge Looks at the Rules After Fifteen Years of Use, 15 F.R.D. 155, 165
(1954).
33Rule 170(c), supra note 26.
34 Rule 167, supra note 6.
3See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hollingsworth, 156 Tex. 176, 293 S.W.2d 639, 642
(1956), discussed by Thode, The Case for the Pre-Trial Conference in Texas, 35 Texas L.
Rev. 372, 397 (1957), and Thode, supra note I1, at 35. See also Steely and Gayle, Opera-
tion of the Discovery Rules, 2 Hous. L. Rev. 222 (1964).
36 Rule 167, supsra note 6.
'Steely and Gayle, Operation of the Discovery Rules, 2 Hous. L. Rev. 222 (1964).
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recite precisely what is wanted."3 At the discovery hearing the trial
judge first must determine requisite good cause and relevancy and
then whether or not the item is privileged. Invasion of privacy,
necessarily incident to discovery, is justifiable only because the pur-
suit of justice eclipses the fundamental right of privacy; however,
invasion of privacy must be kept to an absolute minimum.3'
A. Objection To Discovery Under Rule 167
Opposition by a party to a motion to produce is specifically
authorized. As a prerequisite to an order to produce documents
movant must establish: (1) their existence, (2) custody, control or
possession by a party, (3) good cause, (4) probability of relevance,
and (5) nonprivilege. Only opposing claims of failure to show good
cause, relevancy or privilege will be considered here.
1. Good Cause Requisite good cause is manifested "when the court
is 'satisfied that the production of the requested document is neces-
sary to enable a party to properly prepare his case, or that it will
facilitate proof or progress at the trial.' "" Good cause also exists in
circumstances which give the court reason to expect that the bene-
ficial objectives of pretrial discovery will be achieved.4'
In general, movant is required to show that the documents sought:
(1) will aid in preparation of the case, (2) are necessary to establish
movant's case and are unobtainable from other sources, and (3)
must be produced to prevent hardship or injustice.
2. Relevancy In Crane v. Tunks4" the Supreme Court of Texas
declared that the prerequisites to discovery under rule 167 are the
filing of a motion with notice to opposing parties, showing good
cause, and showing that such things constitute or contain evidence
31id. at 223.
39 Maresca v. Marks, 362 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1962). Texas courts have ordered pro-
duction of numerous things: income tax returns, Ex parte Ladon, 160 Tex. 7, 325 S.W.2d
121 (1959); a horse, Robb v. Gilmore, 302 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref.
n.r.e.; finance company ledger cards, Western Guaranty Loan Co. v. Dean, 309 S.W.2d 857
(Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.; proof of truck ownership, Gray v. Armstrong,
364 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); contracts, Southwestern States Oil & Gas Co. v.
Sovereign Resources, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) error ref. n.r.e.; banking
commissioner's report, Benson v. San Antonio Says. Ass'n, 374 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. 1963); and
truck maintenance records, Railway Express Agency v. Spain, 249 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952), no opinion rendered on appeal, 152 Tex. 196, 255 S.W.2d 509 (1953). See text
accompanying note 70 infra. Under the federal rule discovery of the following has been
ordered: corporate books and records, ships' logs, hospital records, social security records,
cancelled checks, photographs, original manuscripts, governmental records, drawings, sales
records, business records, bank records, employment records, contracts, patent applications,
etc. 4 Moore, Federal Practice 5 34.09, at 2456-57 (2d ed. 1963).
' 3 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 10.03 (1950).
" Crowe v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 29 F.R.D. 148, 151 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
41 160 Tex. 186, 328 S.W.2d 434 (1959).
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material to a matter in the controversy. The court noted that rele-
vancy and materiality should be shown in the application or petition
asking for the bill of discovery or by the pleading in the main cause.4
Relevancy tests are usually liberally construed." However, estab-
lishing relevancy does not open the door to unlimited discovery.
"[T]he discovery procedure clearly does not authorize the examina-
tion and reproduction of information of a highly personal and private
nature not relevant and material to the issues ....
An insurance investigator's reports and interoffice correspondence
concerning investigation of an accident were sought in a suit to
recover from respondent under a general liability policy for adverse
judgment in favor of a third party. The appellate court in affirming
the granting of discovery reasoned, "These instruments were relevant
to show the intention and construction placed by [respondent] .. .
on its contract of liability insurance before any liability under its
policy had attached . . . .
3. Privileged Matter4  Relief is available to a party from "undue
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or expense." '4' Discovery also
does not extend to written communications passing between agents,
representatives or employees of either litigant, or to communications
between a litigant, his agents or representatives when made subse-
quent to the occurrence of the basis of suit and in connection with
preparation for trial."4'
Privilege must be affirmatively asserted in opposition to a motion
to produce." In Hurley v. McMillian," a personal injury action stem-
ming from an auto collision, respondent in a plea of privilege hearing
failed to assert that the written statement given the insurer's investi-
gator was a privileged communication under the attorney-client re-
lationship. The court held that respondent's failure to claim that the
statement was privileged resulted in a waiver of the privilege.
a. Attorney Work-Product.-The 1947 decision of the United
4a Id. at 440.
44 See, e.g., June v. George C. Peterson Co., 155 F.2d 963, 967 (7th Cir. 1946), which
held, "if the documents called for are reasonably probable to be material in the case, the
production and inspection of them should be allowed."
41 Maresca v. Marks, 362 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex. 1962).
"Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Griffith, 290 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)
error ref., n.r.e.
"'The privilege of protection from self-incrimination and the use of evidence illegally
obtained are beyond the scope of this Article.
4 Tex. R. Civ. P. 186b (Supp. 1965).
49 Rule 167, supra note 6.
"See, e.g., Wilson v. David, 21 F.R.D. 217 (W.D. Mich. 1957).
5' 268 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.
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States Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor,52 together with the
opinions of the courts below," clarified some of the uncertainty con-
cerning the attorney-client privilege and work-product of the law-
yer. Mr. Justice Murphy in his opinion held the work-product of
the lawyer outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege. That
privilege was held not to extend to information obtained from a wit-
ness by an attorney, "the memoranda, briefs, communications and
other writings prepared by counsel for his own use in prosecuting his
client's case; [and] ...writings which reflect an attorney's mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories.""4 However, dis-
covery of such material was held to be against public policy unless
the movant establishes that the information contained therein can be
obtained in no other manner and that undue hardship will otherwise
result.
When rule 167 was adopted in 1940, the Supreme Court of Texas
was disinclined to await the ponderous federal interpretation of the
attorney work-product which was far from certain under the federal
rule. Accordingly, the Texas rule55 specifies that the attorney's work-
product is privileged.
Opinions, reports and information of expert witnesses of the ad-
verse party, in counsel's possession, are unattainable by the motion to
produce. However, the privilege does not extend to the trial, so "if
52329 U.S. 495 (1947).
53 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945), reversing 4 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
" Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947).
553 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 10.03, at 844 (1950). For example, under FRCP
34 witness lists, even if obtained by employees, are discoverable, but its Texas counterpart, as
shown in the leading case of Ex parte Ladon, 160 Tex. 7, 325 S.W.2d 121 (1959), specifical-
ly excludes from discovery communications passing between agents, representatives, and em-
ployees of any party subsequent to the transaction or occurrence upon which the suit is based
and made in connection with the prosecution, investigation, or defense of the claim. 38
Texas L. Rev. 642, 643 (1960). Accord, 9 Tex. B.J. 319 (1946). Cf. Perez v. San Antonio
Transit Co., 342 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref., and Dallas Ry. & Terminal
v. Oehler, 156 Tex. 488, 296 S.W.2d 757 (1956), where the question was treated as an
evidence problem under Tex. R. Civ. P. 177a.
Are statements obtained by a party for use in connection with a previously-completed
case subject to discovery in a subsequent suit? This novel question was presented in Highway
Insurance Underwriters v. Griffith, 290 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.
The trial judge was held to be within his discretion in granting the motion and ordering
respondent to produce statements and reports taken by respondent's investigator to determine
the nature of the accident. The court found that the statements were relevant to show the
intention and construction placed by respondent on its contract of liability insurance before
any liability under its policy had attached by reason of the judgment against movant. It
apparently reasoned that no attempt was being made to discover the work product of the
attorney emanating from this litigation and that the statements were not therefore within
the protection of rule 167.
" Biggers v. State, 358 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error ref. n.r.e., 360 S.W.2d
516 (Tex. 1962) (accident analyst); City of Houston v. Autrey, 351 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e. (appraiser); and Shirley v. Dalby, 384 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964) error ref. n.r.e. (appraiser). See 2A Barron and Holtzoff-Wright, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure § 652.5 (1961).
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the witness had acquired personal knowledge or opinions relevant to
the cause on trial he can properly be called . . . and those opinions
elicited. This is assuming [the risk of] . . . that expert's backlash."5
b. Privileged Communications
(1) Attorney-Client.-The leading Texas case regarding com-
munications between attorney and client, McGrede v. Rembert Na-
tional Bank, 8 has been credited with holding "that the determina-
tion of the attorney-client privilege is a question for the trial court.""
(2) Husband and Wife.-The statute for civil cases provides,
"The husband or wife of a party to a suit or proceeding, or who is
interested in the issue to be tried, shall not be incompetent to testify
therein, except as to confidential communications between such hus-
band and wife.""0 Presumably, except in cases of confidential com-
munications, discovery would also be allowed.
(3) Reports to the Government Under Statutory Requirements.-
Attempts to secure information from federal income tax returns have
been presented to the Texas Supreme Court on two occasions. The
rule is now clear that income tax returns are subject to discovery to
the extent of relevancy and materiality shown. 1
" Steely and Gayle, supra note 12, at 225. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse
Party's Expert Information, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 455, 488 (1962):
Neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine should
be extended to cover expert information which they normally would not pro-
tect. If such discovery is to be denied, it should be done on the ground that
disclosure would be unfair under the particular facts of the case. Blanket re-
fusals to require information to be divulged are improper, and, at the very
least, discovery should be permitted when good cause can be shown. Whether
or not the unfairness objection should itself be eliminated, so that expert in-
formation would be treated just like any other, is still to be determined.
58147 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error dism., judm. cor.
z 16 Baylor L. Rev. 202, 205 (1964).
The main qualifications necessary to justify a claim of attorney-client privilege are set
forth by Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357,
358-59 (D. Mass. 1950):
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or
sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was
made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in
connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communi-
cation relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client
(b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing pri-
marily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance
in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime
or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by
the client.
"
5 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3715 (1926).
"5Maresca v. Marks, 362 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex. 1962). The discoverability of income
tax returns is summarized as follows:
The problem was considered by this court in Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182,
328 S.W.2d 434, and it was held that income tax returns are not wholly
privileged documents but are subject to discovery to the extent of relevancy
and materiality which must be shown. It was further held that the trial judge
abused his discretion "on failing to examine the income tax return and to
separate the relevant and material parts from the irrelevant and immaterial
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Numerous Texas statutes provide a promise of secrecy of informa-
tion which individuals and organizations are required to report to
the appropriate departments of government." "It is necessary to
examine the provisions of the statute in each instance to determine
the extent of the protection afforded. In order to cover the necessary
situations a uniform rule should be adopted."("
(4) Physician-Patient.-Texas has no statute creating the privi-
lege, and our courts have invariably denied its recognition. Chief
Justice Calvert's opinion in Neville v. Brewster4 pointed out that
if a doctor's "records are privileged it is only because of a privilege
established by the proviso in Rules 167 and 186a. The records were
not privileged at common law and have not been made so in this
state ....
(5) Voluntary Waiver of Privileged Communication.-In a mal-
practice case"6 the physician-defendant sent a letter detailing facts
parts." . . . In Neville v. Brewster, Tex., 352 S.W.2d 449, 451, we said that
"[i]t was incumbent upon the court to exclude those matters which were
irrelevant and yet afford to the adversary all information that might be rele-
vant and material to his cause of action."
Accord, Lower Nueces River Water Supply Dist. v. Sellers, 323 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959) error ref. n.r.e., records kept to prepare income tax return were held subject to dis-
covery upon a proper showing of relevancy and cause; Martin v. Jenkins, 381 S.W.2d 115
(Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref. n.r.e., 384 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. 1964).
" Illustrative of these statute-required reports are: reports of automobile accidents, Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6687b, § 42 (1960); statements made in investigations by the
state fire marshal as to cause of fire, Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 5.43 (1963); reports of cor-
porations showing financial condition, Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 12.08 (1960); information
obtained by the banking department relative to financial condition of state banks, Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 342, § 210 (1959); records of Department of Public Welfare as to
aged and blind persons and dependent children receiving assistance, Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann.
art. 695c, § 33 (1964); records of probation and parole officers, Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 781d, § 29 (1957); file and records of court in adoption proceedings, Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 46a, § 10 (1959); and records required to be kept by dealers in
narcotic drugs, Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 725b, § 19 (1961).
Veterans' records are privileged under federal statute, 38 U.S.C. § 3301 (1959); and
were so held in the Texas decision of Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1963) error ref. n.r.e. See also Steely and Gayle, Operation of the Discovery Rules,
2 Hous. L. Rev. 222, 224 (1964).
6a 1 McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence § 504, at 430 (2d ed. 1956).
64163 Tex. 155, 352 S.W.2d 449 (1961).
" Id. at 451. Plaintiff did not raise the question of privilege in the trial court as re-
quired by rule 186b and thereby precluded showing any abuse of discretion by the trial
court.
6 Dobbins v. Gardner, 377 S.W.2d 665, 668-69 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref. n.r.e.,
the court added as a practical reason for allowing the letter in evidence that "the intentional
communication of a privileged document to a third person should have the effect of waiving
its privileged nature to obviate the necessity of calling such third person to testify as to the
contents of a document when the original is available in the hands of a party to the cause."
Cf., Note, 16 Baylor L. Rev. 202 (1964) in which a hypothetical situation is posed:
Suppose Dr. A is requested by Dr. B. to send all available information re-
garding the diagnosis and treatment of a particular patient that Dr. A formerly
treated. Suppose also that at the time of this request that litigation is pending
between (sic.) Dr. A and his former patient. Would Dr. A not be reluctant
to send any information that might be privileged to Dr. B if he knew that the
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of the case to the claims department of his insurer with a copy to
the physician who subsequently attended plaintiff. This letter was
presumably excluded by the trial court on the theory that it was a
privileged communication in preparation of the defense. The court
of civil appeals, in a first-impression opinion, reasoned that the
voluntary and intentional disclosure of the letter to someone other
than an agent or representative was implied waiver of the privilege
and reversed the trial court. Guiding principles utilized in reaching
its decision were that the privileged status of an attorney-client com-
munication may be waived by the client and that the privileged
communication exception must be strictly construed, since it ob-
structs the search for truth.
B. Judicial Enforcement Powers
Once it has been determined that discovery in the particular case
is proper, the effective operation of the motion to produce is depend-
ent on the sanctions available in rule 170. The trial court is authorized
to issue just orders enforcing its valid discovery orders.
The first enforcement order the court is authorized to make is
found in rule 170 (a), which provides for "an order that the matters
regarding the character or description of the thing, or the contents
of the paper, or any other designated facts shall be taken to be
established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the
claim of the party obtaining the order . . . . " No case granting
such an order is reported in Texas; however, rule 170(a) closely
parallels its source-sanction FRCP 37 (b) (2) (i), under which several
cases enforcing the federal penalty are reported, including Oregon-
Washington Railroad & Navigation Co. v. Strauss & Company." In
that case respondent failed to produce records as ordered, and the
court held that respondent's intentions concerning a questioned grain
shipment were as movant alleged.
The court also is permitted to make "an order refusing to allow
the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or de-
fenses, or prohibiting him from introducing in evidence designated
documents or things or items of testimony . . . ."" In Railway Express
Agency v. Spain" the respondent failed to comply with an order to
same might be used against him in pending litigation? Id. at 204.
It is proposed that an exception to the waiver principle be granted to phy-
sicians when they are diagnosing the same patient. Id. at 209.
"
7 Tex. R. Civ. P. 170(a).
6838 F. Supp. 229 (D. Ore. 1941); Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 30
F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
"Tex. R. Civ. P. 170(b).
70 249 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), no opinion rendered on appeal, 152 Tex. 196,
255 S.W.2d 509 (1953).
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produce the maintenance record of a truck. During trial the re-
spondent unsuccessfully attempted to introduce the maintenance
record into evidence. In upholding the exclusion, the court of civil
appeals stated: "Sec. (b), Rule 170, T.R.C.P., authorizes a court to
prohibit introduction in evidence of documents which are not pro-
duced as ordered. The trial judge exercised his discretion and punished
[respondent] . . . as he was empowered to do under this Rule and
we find no abuse of discretion in such action."'"
A trial court is also allowed to render "an order striking out
pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the
order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient
party . .'"" In Dunlap v. Chase" respondent filed a plea of privilege,
but movant filed a motion for production of books and records with-
out controverting the plea of privilege. Respondent failed to comply
with the discovery order, contending that until a controverting plea
was filed his prima facie right to transfer deprived the court of
power to order discovery. The trial court, citing rule 170 as authority,
overruled the plea of privilege on the basis of the respondent's non-
compliance with the order, and this action was affirmed on appeal.
The portion of rule 170 (c) quoted above is taken verbatim from
FRCP 37(b) (2) (iii). Sanctions comparable to those provided by
rule 170 (c) have been upheld in numerous federal decisions."
III. INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES"5
The interrogatory, which became effective in Texas on September
1, 1962, is the newest tool in the arsenal of discovery procedures.
A noted legal scholar has said that "interrogatories are used chiefly
71 1d. at 653.
2 Tex. R. Civ. P. 170(c).
73 336 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
M4A part of the claim was stricken in In re Societa Italiana De Armamento, 210 F.
Supp. 444 (D. La. 1962); proceedings were stayed in Zalutuka v. Metropolitan Life In-
surance Company, 108 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1939); and a judgment by default was rendered
against respondent in Bernat v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 14 F.R.D. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
Movant in the Bernal case asserted that a default judgment was the only adequate penalty
to assess the disobedient party, but the court stated:
In a case where the refusal to produce a document makes it impossible for
the plaintiff to prepare or present his case, a default judgment would be the
proper remedy. However, the rule provides for a number of consequences of
varying degrees of severity, and I think it is clearly intended that the Court
should fit the penalty to the nature and effects of the refusal. Of course, in
refusing to obey the order of the Court the defendant takes a calculated risk,
but it is plain that it was not intended that he should automatically incur a
default judgment in every case. Ibid.
"SA distinction must be kept in mind between written interrogatories under rule 168
and depositions on written interrogatories under rule 192. All references to "interrogatories"
are meant to denote rule 168 interrogatories.
196 5]
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to obtain simple facts, to narrow the issues by obtaining admissions
from the adverse party, and to obtain information needed in order
to make use of the other discovery. '
Interrogatories offer an alternate discovery device for use in lieu
of or in conjunction with the request for admissions of fact or
depositions. The interrogatory asks a question requiring a narrative
answer in contrast with the request for admissions which is an im-
perative statement requiring a "yes" or "no" answer." It is readily
evident that the interrogatory is broader in scope, more flexible and
less time consuming than requests for admissions. Written interroga-
tories are normally a more economical means of procuring discovery
than an oral or written deposition, although they are frequently less
effective than either form of deposition since the adverse party will
answer with less spontaneity, and, having all the interrogatories be-
fore him, may frame his answers to defeat disclosure." The interroga-
tory answer can be used only against the answering adverse party
compared with the more general use permitted of depositions. "Rule
168 is a great shortcut for the development of evidence that a diligent
lawyer would eventually obtain anyway, but by the use of very
expensive and time-consuming deposition procedures. Also, another
great advantage is that interrogatories avoid multiplicity of re-
quests.
70
Neither the Texas nor federal rules contain a provision concerning
the number of interrogatories which may be served. The guide in
determining objections to interrogatories should be whether they were
reasonable in the particular case and not their number."° The trial
courts of one Texas metropolitan district are understood to use as
a rough rule of thumb that ten questions are the maximum reason-
able number of interrogatories. s' The federal rule seems the prefer-
able guide.
7' Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 Mich.
L. Rev. 205 (1942).
"r See text accompanying notes 124-125 infra.
784 Moore, Federal Practice 5 33.02, at 2259 (2d ed. 1963): "[T]he replies are cus-
tomarily prepared under the immediate supervision of counsel, who 'are sometimes quite
resourceful in their ability to devise noninformative answers.' " See also, Developments in
the Law-Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 959-60 (1961).
"8 Steely and Gayle, Operation of the Discovery Rules, 2 Hous. L. Rev. 222, 228 (1964).
so Canuso v. City of Niagra Falls, 4 F.R.D. 362 (W.D.N.Y. 1945); Stonybrook Tenants
Ass'n. Inc. v. Alpert, 29 F.R.D. 165 (D. Conn. 1961).
"A member of the Dallas Bar has advised that in practice Dallas courts shift the
burden to the movant to justify interrogatories in excess of ten, although such policy
probably would be denied. Compare Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Pub. Co.,
12 F.R.D. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), involving an alleged conspiracy in restraint of trade
and monopolization in the publishing business. Movant submitted interrogatories filling
fifty-three pages and by respondent's computation involving 9,769 separate paragraphs and
requiring more than 293,000 answers. Respondent made a general objection to all the
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1965] SANCTIONS IN TEXAS DISCOVERY
Interrogatories are initiated by movant's serving written questions
on respondent. Thus this is a self-executing82 discovery device with
respondent answering each question separately and fully, in writing,
under oath. Should respondent deem an interrogatory objectionable,
provision is made for the filing of written objections with notice of
hearing. This is the first time the trial judge becomes involved in
this discovery procedure,s in contrast with judicial control from the
outset under the motion to produce."
Rule 168, as other discovery devices, should be given a broad and
liberal interpretation to achieve the proper ends of discovery." Never-
theless, the interrogated party should not have to give opinions,
contentions or conclusions as to matters of law, or make research
and compilation of information not readily known to him.8 Neither
should this liberal interpretation extend to compelling answers from
a respondent who declines to answer on the basis of possible self-
incrimination."s
Normally, a party will not be required to answer interrogatories
if he either has no information or cannot obtain information by due
inquiry.8 Therefore, a problem arises in determining what consti-
tutes "due inquiry"8 by the respondent.
First, it should be pointed out that the question of due inquiry
is a matter solely within the court's discretion. 8 Tests based on ex-
pense or effort have proven inconclusive, since they are relative
standards which vary with each fact situation and group of adver-
interrogatories that in the aggregate they submit him to "oppression, undue annoyance, and
expense." Id. at 534. The court, despite a determination that 264,000 of these answers were
readily aavilable to movant, rejected any objection based solely on the number of interroga-
tories. "No doubt these interrogatories impose some burden on [respondent] .... Inter-
rogatories generally do, but the burden here is far from constituting such hardship as
to require striking the entire set of interrogatories on the basis of annoyance, expense and
oppression. Further consideration of the objection of annoyance and oppression will be
given, however, where appropriate to particular interrogatories." Id. at 535.
82 Interrogatories are "self-executing" in that they may be served and, under ideal
conditions, answered without resort to the court.
83 Rule 168, supra note 7.
s Rule 167, supra note 6.
85 There is nothing mandatory about the discovery provisions of the Rules. On
the contrary, the purpose and intent is evident throughout to leave their appli-
cation to the discretion of the trial court-not, of course, an absolute dis-
cretion but one controlled and governed, not only by statutory enactments
and the well established rules of common law, but also by considerations of
policy and of necessity, propriety and expediency in the particular case at
hand. United States v. Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289, 291 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
s"E.g., Reed v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 28 F.R.D. 26, 28 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
87 United States v. 47 Bottles, More or Less, Each Containing 30 Capsules of Jenasol
R.J. Formula '60', 26 F.R.D. 4, 5-6 (D.N.J. 1960).
88 E.g., RCA Mfg. Co. v. Decca Records, 1 F.R.D. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
s9See note 103 infra.
'0 Newell v. Phillips Petr. Co., 144 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1944).
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saries." A more realistic guide is whether the matter is involved in
the preparation of respondent's own case." It would be unreasonable
to require respondent to prepare his adversary's case " or to research
and compile data equally available to movant." However, in instances
requiring examination of data supplemented by unrecorded knowl-
edge of respondent " answers are more readily compelled.
A. Answers Contrary To Rule 168
There are few reported Texas cases dealing with rule 168. " The
adaptation of a rule from the federal rules is presumed to be in the
context of the decisions construing the source rule." These cases
logically divide into (1) unresponsive and (2) evasive answers to
interrogatories. The former generally contain surplusage, whereas the
latter fail to answer the precise question posed. "Answers to interroga-
tories must be complete, explicit and responsive."" s
1. Unresponsive Answers Rule 168 provides that interrogatories
shall be answered separately, fully, in writing and under oath. Un-
responsive answers were given in a federal case arising over allegedly
defective synthetic glue used in the manufacture of chairs." Movant
" See Cinema Amusements v. Loew's, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 318, 322 (D. Del. 1947).
"2 RCA Mfg. Co. v. Decca Records, 1 F.R.D. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
" Porter v. Central Chevrolet, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 86 (N.D. Ohio 1946).
S4 See Byers Theatres, Inc. v. Murphy, 1 F.R.D. 286 (W.D. Va. 1940).
8 Cinema Amusements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 318, 322 (D. Del. 1947).
9 E.g., Harrington v. State, 385 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
97 Ex parle Odom, 153 Tex. 537, 271 S.W.2d 796 (1954).
984 Moore, op. cit. supra note 78, 33.26, at 2330.
"
9 Sikes Co. v. Swift & Co., 9 F.R.D. 19 (W.D.N.Y. 1959). Other examples of un-
responsive answers in that case are:
Interrogatory 3 (c)-"State upon what particular items of plaintiff's line
of furniture the same (synthetic glue) was used, describing each item by
trade name or other description." Answer-"Office chairs." Interrogatory
3 (d)-"State what part or parts of each were joined with said synthetic glue."
Answer-"Initially all parts, except seats." Interrogatory 3 (e)-"State
whether any part or parts of any such items were joined by any adhesive or
glue other than said synthetic glue and, if so, what part or parts were so
joined." Answer-"Initially seats, and later all parts except Bank of England
top and arm assembly."
The answer to Interrogatory 3(c) is not "fully" made. The complaint
alleges and realleges "That plaintiff is and at all times herein mentioned has
been engaged in ...manufacturing and selling an extensive line of office furni-
ture, including particularly a chair known as the 'Bank of England' . . . that
the plaintiff is one of the largest producers of office chairs in the country
and one of the largest producers of office chairs of the 'Bank of England'
type."
The term "office chairs" is indeterminate. It may mean all office chairs or
only some. If it means only the "Bank of England" type, plaintiff must say
so. If it comprises other types, plaintiff must designate each of these types
by trade name or other description. The complaint does not limit the allega-
tions of defective glue to the "Bank of England" type. The uncertainty of
3(c) invades 3(d) and 3(e), which are further obscured by the adverb
"initially." Plaintiff in these two answers must give dates and, if the revised
answer to 3 (c) specifies lines of furniture other than "Bank of England"
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by interrogatory asked what tests, trials or experiments were made
of the glue and the dates and names of the testing personnel. Re-
spondent answered that tests were made under the supervision of
movant's representative Cox starting about the time of the first
order; however, the response continued "[respondent] commenced
the use of said glue in production under the direction and supervision
of said representatives of [movant] . . . and in reliance upon their
representations, warranties and statements that the said glue was
suitable for use in the business of [respondent]. . . ." The quoted
portion of respondent's answer was unresponsive. Interrogatory
18 (d) asked the amount and volume of business transacted by re-
spondent with each of its customers during the preceding years.
Respondent answered that the information was unknown and further
that it was "unable to state specifically the loss of business from any
particular source." The trial court likewise held this answer wholly
unresponsive, since movant did not inquire about respondent's losses
but about its business during the three years prior to the first loss,
and decreed that respondent must answer this interrogatory.
Answers were also held unresponsive in a 1957 federal decision.'
Respondent was asked (1) the date of acceptance of a shipment, to
which respondent answered, "the bill of lading shows the goods were
receipted for October 31, 1950," and (2) if a dock receipt was
issued at the time of receipt of the shipment, to which respondent
replied that "a search is being made for any dock receipt given."
The court directed respondent to answer these interrogatories, and
if the requested information be unavailable, respondent should answer
under oath setting forth in detail the efforts made to obtain the
information.
In a workmen's compensation case ' interpreting the equivalent
federal rule, respondent's answer that he had "received workmen's
compensation" was held unresponsive to an interrogatory asking
whether respondent had agreed to accept payments other than work-
men's compensation.
Under federal interrogatory practice it has been held that neither
making records available to the moving party, nor stating that upon
completion of a survey data will be furnished, is adequate answer
type of office chairs, these dates must be separately stated for each line.
Id. at 21. (Also of interest are the answers to 5(b), 5(c), 6(a), 8(a), 9(d), 10(e), 13(a),
18(a), 18(b), 18(c) and 21.
... International Fertilizer & Chem. Corp. v. Brasileiro and the S.S. Loide Guatemala, 21
F.R.D. 193, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
101 Wolf v. Dickinson, 15 F.R.D. 407, 408 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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to an interrogatory seeking specific figures."2
Answers should fairly meet the essence of the interrogatories or
consist of written objection thereto with notice of early hearing.
2. Evasive Answers Interrogatory answers shall be direct, without
evasion, and in accord with the available information, after due in-
quiry.' Otherwise, the issues of the trial are not simplified, and dis-
covery becomes useless.
In a wrongful death action arising from a pedestrian-auto acci-
dent movant's interrogatories asked (i) whether movant's taxi or
another vehicle struck decedent, (ii) if it was claimed that both
vehicles struck decedent, which vehicle first struck decedent, and
(iii) if it was claimed that both struck the decedent simultaneously,
a description of the decedent's position at the time she was struck.
Respondents' answer and objections said they were not present at
the time and place of their mother's death so therefore had no knowl-
edge of the cause, and accordingly were unable to answer movant's
interrogatories. Respondents' answers were held an evasion and
proper answers were ordered made. The court reasoned that these
interrogatories asked what respondents claimed, not for detailed
facts of the accident. Surely respondents "know what they claim.
One of the principle purposes of interrogatories is to make the claims
known."'0
Responses to interrogatories concerning movant's state of health
were held evasive in Smith v. Aetna Life Insurance Company."5
Movant, a doctor, sought to enforce an accident income policy re-
pudiated by respondent on the grounds of fraudulent application and
disability resulting from disease rather than accident. Movant, by
interrogatory, sought to determine respondent's allegations as to the
nature of his alleged brain or nervous disease with details as to the
medical terms commonly used, date of his first affliction, progress at
time of application, and names, addresses, and dates of any claimed
attending physicians. Respondent did not challenge the propriety of
the interrogatory. Respondent's answers alleged that movant had a
disease or diseases of the brain or nervous system "symptomized by
extreme nervousness and neurotic tendencies, and an abnormal way
"'
2 See Austin Theatre v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 22 F.R.D. 302, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
The opinion noted that: "Almost two and one-half years have passed since the original in-
terrogatories were served. No request has been received from [Respondent] . . .for an ex-
tension of time for answering the interrogatories concerning which he had stipulated."
'e3See Uinta Oil Ref. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 226 F. Supp. 495 (D. Utah 1964);
Gaumond v. Spector Motor Serv., 1 F.R.D. 364 (D. Mass. 1940).
""Robinson v. Tracy, 16 F.R.D. 113, 116 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
'58 F.R.D. 554 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
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of life, the basic diagnosis of which is not known to [respondent]
* .. " The disease "included a neurotic condition and abnormalities
of the brain or nervous system, causing excessive nervousness and
other abnormalities, the exact nature of which is unknown to this
[respondent]. . . ." He further contended that movant's condition
at time of application was advanced to a marked degree, otherwise
respondent disclaimed knowledge of application, or names or dates
of treating physicians. The court in rejecting these answers reasoned:
[S]ince [respondents] . . . refuse either to give the asserted condition
a name, or otherwise to indicate the "basic diagnosis," whatever that
means [movant] . . . is entitled to know at least what the alleged
manifestations of the condition were, or are believed to have been.
Such information would enable [movant] . . . to undertake to show
(a) that there were no such manifestations, or (b) if there were, that
they were not symptomatic of brain or nervous disease. The latter,
of course, would be a subject of expert testimony, and he is entitled to
know in advance of trial, whether he is required to provide himself
with a witness who is competent to testify on the subject.'
B. Judicial Enforcement Powers
Even if answers to interrogatories have been found improper there
are no effective sanctions to enforce interrogatories under rule 168.
Although some courts may find ways to close this loophole, there
is no substitute for a properly-drafted sanction. Current studies...
offer hope of early correction of this anomaly in Texas pretrial dis-
covery procedure.
FRCP 33, from which rule 168 is adapted, finds its requisite sanc-
tions in FRCP 37(a) and (d). On motion and notice in a proper
case a federal trial court may compel answers and grant recoupment
of the reasonable expense incurred, together with attorney's fees
incident thereto. The other sanctions which may be applied against
a party who wilfully fails to answer an interrogatory are to strike
pleadings, dismiss the action, or enter a default judgment. Also,
penalties of varying degrees apply to passive or active degrees of
disobedience.
The limited sanctions available to enforce interrogatories are dis-
cussed in Uses and Abuses of Rule 168-Interrogatories to Parties:
It is interesting to note that the sanctions of Rule 170 for refusal
to make discovery under these companion Rules (167 and 169) have
not been made applicable to the newly adopted Rule 168 . . . . Just
what authority a court has in case of a party's refusal to answer proper
106Id. at 555.
107 Steely and Gayle, supra note 79, at 231.
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interrogatories under this Rule is not clear. It is assumed that Rule
215a, adopted along with Rule 168, does not apply to these interroga-
tories to parties. The mention of "written interrogatories" appears to
refer to those authorized by Rule 189, that is depositions taken on
written interrogatories. It would, however, seem reasonable that in
passing on objections the court could make appropriate orders in both
directions under this new Rule.'08
It is certain that the design of the framers of rule 215a' 09 was to
provide means of compelling answers to oral depositions and depo-
sitions on written interrogatories."0
The only ground that can be urged for including rule 168 inter-
rogatories under rule 215a is found within the vague contours of
subdivisions (b) and (c) thereof. Subdivision (a) of rule 215a
provides that a party may apply for an order "to the court in which
the action is pending or to the district court in the district where
the deposition is taken . . . .... Subdivision (a) relates to depositions
and is susceptible of no other interpretation.
The language of subdivision (b) provides penalties available
should a party or witness refuse to comply with an order entered
pursuant to rule 215a. Accordingly, no relation to rule 168 can be
found in the last sentence, which enumerates as an additional sanction
"those permitted by Rule 170."
The strongest case for applying rule 215a sanctions to interroga-
tories is found in subdivision (c), which is an adaptation of FRCP
37 (d). It is clear that FRCP 37 (d) is applicable to both depositions
and interrogatories submitted under FRCP 33; however, rule 215a
provides that the sanction is to enforce "oral depositions or . . .
answers to written interrogatories or cross-interrogatories under these
rules . . .,1,
The last paragraph of the rule contains language also implying
that the rule is effective only to enforce depositions of any witness
"who is to [give] his oral deposition or answers to written interroga-
tories or cross-interrogatories under these rules [and who] . . . may
be punished as for contempt of the court in which the action is
pending or of the district court in the district in which such deposi-
0s Spencer, Uses and Abuses of Rule 168-Interrogatories to Parties, 26 Tex. B. J. 919,
919-20 (1963).
10 Tex. R. Civ. P. 215a. Refusal to Answer Question or Interrogatory; Consequences.
"' See Tex. R. Civ. P. Ann. 281 (Supp. 1964), the author in his comments says:
Looking now to Rule 215a, it will be seen that its objective is to place under
the control of the court the matter of dealing with witnesses and parties who
refuse to make pretrial disclosure by deposition, and to provide an effective
and expeditious procedure for coping with the problem .... (Emphasis added.)
'Tex. R. Civ. P. 21 5a (a). (Emphasis added.)
112 ibid.
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tion or answers are to be taken . *.. .. The language emphasized
above is foreign to rule 168 interrogatories because they (1) would
not be oral and (2) are extrajudicial in nature so that no district
court jurisdiction attaches to the place of answering.
Rule 215a is located within section 9, "Evidence and Deposition,"
of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; this is further evidence that
its effect is limited to deposition practice and should not be stretched
to include a discovery device such as rule 168 interrogatories.
IV. REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS OF FACT
The request for admissions may be directed to any other party and
should consist of a written demand for admission of the genuineness
of any relevant document or of the truth of any relevant matter set
forth in such request.' The request for admissions must include a
designated period, not less than ten days, for the answering party to
serve sworn reply."' The binding effect on the answering party is
limited to the capacities in which he is addressed."'
The request for admissions is not a true discovery device since the
moving party knows the facts or possesses the documents inquired
about and actually is attempting to obtain conscious admission of a
matter that in good faith should not be controverted."7 Requests for
admissions of ultimate issues are not contemplated. The admissions
practice is designed to dispense with the necessity of proof as to un-
disputed issues. "This purpose is met when the request lists evi-
dentiary matters. Of course, many times when all evidentiary matters
are admitted, the ultimate issue will stand undisputed. But this does
not alter the purpose of this procedure.""'
Each request for admissions should consist of a categorical state-
ment"' that a specific fact is true. Examples of sufficiently leading
requests are:
"Your name is John Jones and you are the defendant in this case.
"At the time of the collision between defendant's truck and the
car driven by Vernice Gibbens on September 30, 1950, Wayne
Lawler was the agent or employee of Montgomery Trucking Com-
pany.
113 Ibid.
"1 2A Barron and Holtzoff-Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 831 (1961).
"' Rule 169, supra note 8.
"'Krasa v. Derrico, 193 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref.
117 Subcommittee on Interpretation of Rules of Civil Procedure, Opinion, 5 Tex. B.J.
124, 125 (1942); 8 Tex. B.J. 3, 11 (1945).
118 Masterson, Admissions, 13 Tex. B.J. 447, 468 (1950).
"'3 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 10.03 (1950).
12Montgomery v. Gibbens, 245 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Masterson, Ad-
versary Depositions and Admissions Under Texas Practice, 10 Sw. L.J. 107, 113 (1956).
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In Texas the request for admissions was the most frequently used
discovery device prior to the advent of rule 168. The interrogatory
has largely replaced the request because it is 'so much broader, more
flexible, and more convenient to use...... The actual problem lies in
the misuse of the request for admissions.
If parties insist, as they generally do, on asking their opponents
to admit as facts, dates and events about which there is room for
doubt or argument, of course the endeavor to obtain admissions breaks
down; but if the demand is limited to facts not really in dispute, that
is, which can be admitted cleanly, or subject to some simple qualifi-
cation, I find that it is generally acceded to, and the power which the
Court has of throwing the costs on any one who has increased them
by declining reasonable admissions is not forgotten.' 2
An answer to requests for admissions pursuant to rule 169 must
be (1) an admission, (2) a sworn statement denying specifically,
or (3) a sworn statement explaining the inability to deny or admit."'
Abuses occur in the area of the qualified answer, which may be
categorized as (i) unresponsive or (ii) evasive.
A. Answers Contrary To Rule 169
Unsatisfactory answers may be divided into (1) unresponsive an-
swers and (2) evasive answers, the latter being further subdivided
into (a) equivocations, (b) refusal to admit or deny, and (c) a con-
tention that the admission requested is a matter of law. As with
interrogatories unresponsive answers normally contain self-serving
surplusage, while evasive answers avoid meeting the substance of the
requests. Often, the problems stem from improper or poorly-drafted
requests for admissions.
1. Unresponsive Answers The unresponsive or self-serving response"'
to a request for admissions is an attempt to circumvent the purpose
of discovery and, in addition, to admit unobtrustively evidence favor-
able to respondent. This normally involves a conscious or active dis-
obedience by respondent.
Requests should be a statement of fact to which admission is re-
quested, so worded that it can be answered "yes" or no. Rule
121 Steely and Gayle, supra note 79, at 227.
".. Clarke v. Clarke, Weekly N. 130 (1899), cited at 4 Moore, Federal Practice 36.03,
at 2707 (2d ed. 1963).
12 Rule 169, supra note 8.
124 An unresponsive answer fails to fairly meet the substance of the request. Frequently,
the unresponsive answer takes the form of a self-serving declaration. Precise definitions of
unresponsive, or evasive answers are non-existent, leading to confusion in the courts' opinions.
12 Strictly speaking, either a "yes" or "no" answer to a request for admissions is un-
responsive. The "request" is in reality an imperative involving a statement of fact: "admit
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169 permits qualification in the response to include explanatory or
qualifying language.2 ' It is in this area that abuses are common.
The problem of the unresponsive answer was first dealt with in
Texas in Mosby v. Texas el Pacific Railway."' Movant, suing for
personal injuries, sought admissions that the derailment had been
caused by a rail breaking. Movant requested admissions: (1) that
the particular train was derailed, (2) that movant was the conductor,
(3) that the train was in interstate commerce, (4) that the train
was running sixty miles per hour, and (5) that under the American
Experience Tables a man of sixty would have a life expectancy of
14.10 years. Respondent's answer was a narrative rather than an
answer to each item separately, as required by the rule:
[Movant] at the time of said accident was the conductor on the
freight train involved in said accident; that three freight cars and a
caboose were derailed due to the breaking of a rail, which resulted from
a fissure in the rail, no part of which fissure extended to the outer
portion of the rail, and which fissure was not discoverable . . . it being
a latent, unseeable defect....
Said accident occurred on February 8, 1941, about three miles west
of Allamore, Texas . . . said train was running about sixty miles per
hour, and was moving in interstate commerce.
That said rail broke in two places, at both of which places there
were fissures as above described.
[Respondent] has not examined the American Experience Table of
Mortality, and it is not a matter connected with its business, and it
neither denies nor affirms [movant's] . . . statement . . . but demands
strict proof thereof."'
Movant at the trial introduced the admission, together with evi-
dence of respondent's negligence. Respondent contended that movant
was bound by these admissions that the accident was a result of a
latent defect, and, accordingly, that respondent was entitled to an
instructed verdict. The appellate court held respondent's unrespon-
sive surplusage to be an explanation rather than an answer and not
binding on movant. "If the rule be extended and held to embrace
the surplusage, unresponsive, and voluntary statements of the adverse
the pencil is yellow." An answer of "no" would be taken to mean that the respondent denied
that the pencil is in fact yellow, but logically could as well mean that he is responding
negatively to the command to admit. If an argument based on the semantics of admissions
were made to a court it would undoubtedly scoff. However, no inherent vice in the law
requires that it be written unintelligibly. Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law 424 (1964).
26 Masterson, supra note 120, at 121.
127 191 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). Contra, Womble v. Wiley, 209 S.W.2d 201
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948). Both discussed in Note, 27 Texas L. Rev. 562-63 (1949) with the
conclusion that the correct rule is set forth in the Mosby case, i.e., that unresponsive an-
swers are not binding on the party seeking the admission. Cf. Halbert v. Sylestine, 292
S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
... Mosby v. Tex. & Pac. Ry., supra note 127 at 57.
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party and hold him who seeks the admissions bound thereby, the
rule is at once rendered altogether useless and worthless. 12.
The unresponsive qualifying portion of an offered addition to an
answer was excluded in an auto-truck collision case.' Movant re-
quested respondent to admit that she or her husband had commented
that there were a great number of lights ahead on the highway, and
had speculated on the possibilities of a wreck. Original counsel for re-
spondent answered this question affirmatively. Subsequently, respond-
ent sought to add the following qualification "with the further addi-
tion that [she] ... would testify that her husband had started to stop,
that is, that he had let up on the foot feed, but had not applied the
brake." The appellate court affirmed rejection of the latter statement,
since the request was fully answered and the offered qualifying addi-
tion was not responsive to the question.
Unique responses were elicited in Wilkinson v. Paschall."' The un-
responsive answers were held not binding on movant, but no ade-
quate remedy was afforded, apparently due to movant's lack of
pursuit. One request asked if respondent had ever seen movant drink
whiskey, to which respondent answered, "I have never been asso-
ciated with or around [movant] . . . and was not acquainted with
him until 14 days after he got drunk and run over the cow on the
night of October 3d, 1946." (Emphasis added.) The trial court held
the first request immaterial and the answer thereto not detrimental,
and presumably no sanction was applicable. The answer was held
unresponsive to the question, improper and shown upon the trial of
the case to be hearsay. The admission requested apparently was proven
at the trial. Accordingly, the amount of damage was the added ex-
pense in offering proof. Apparently, movant filed no motion for
reimbursement of his expense, so no sanctions were imposed." 2
In summary, the party making the unresponsive answer cannot
introduce it at either pretrial or trial. Upon motion of the requesting
party at either pretrial or trial, the court should strike the unre-
sponsive part of respondent's answer. However, should movant tender
the undiluted answer, he may be bound thereby until it is expunged
from the record.""
129 Id. at 58. See also Note, 27 Texas L. Rev. 562 (1949).
... Cruse v. Daniels, 293 S.W.2d 616, 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e. Mo-
vant's request no. 2 asked if respondent would testify substantially to the effect that "I do
remember that prior to the collision and as we drove on the highway East of Sudan, either
[my husband] . . . or I one mentioned that there were a great number of lights in the
road and that perhaps there might have been a wreck."
... 210 S.W.2d 215, 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
"32 Rule 170(c), supra note 26, provides that movant "may apply to the court for an
order requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses in making such proof"
and, unless motion for reimbursement is made, the expenses are deemed waived.
23Masterson, supra note 120.
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2. Evasive Answers Evasive answers generally are less than a com-
plete answer to the request. Evasive answers may be the product of
conscious disobedience or, too frequently, neglect on respondent's
part.
a. Equivocations.-The amandment of FRCP 36 was designed to
prevent an objection to a part of a request from delaying answers
to the remainder of the request." While language similar to FRCP
36 as amended is not found in rule 169, a like result has been reached
by Texas courts in Bowman Biscuit Company of Texas v. Hines,'
in which movant requested admission that the unbroken packages of
Apricot Puff cookies in question were delivered to respondent on or
about October 5, 1948. Respondent answered that "delivery date of
such 'Apricot Puff' cookies to [respondent] . . . was September 24,
1948." The court held that only a portion13 of the request had been
answered, and no denial was made of the balance, nor qualification
of the unanswered part showing it could neither be admitted nor
denied. Accordingly, the entire question was deemed admitted.
b. Refusal to Admit or Deny.-"This defendant cannot either ad-
mit or deny" is an often tried and invariably ineffective response
unless substantiated by a statement detailing the respondent's in-
ability to answer. This answer, or variations of it, has been held to
result in admissions.
The leading case, Montgomery v. Gibbens,"3 ' treats the matter so
well that no doubt should exist as to the ineffectiveness of such an-
swers. Movant requested admissions from respondent that he was the
owner of the truck involved in a collision and that the driver was
his agent or employee and at the time was acting within the scope
of his employment. Respondent's answer to request No. 5 concerning
scope of employment is representative: that he "cannot truthfully
either admit or deny the matters set forth in request No. 5 for the
reason that he has no actual personal knowledge of any collision
between any one of his trucks and a car driven by [movant] . . .
and for that particular reason cannot swear to said statements con-
134 Moore, op. cit. supra note 122, 5 36.01 at 2703-04. The following language was added
to accomplish this purpose: "A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested ad-
mission, and when good faith requires that a party deny only a part or a qualification of
a matter of which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and
deny only the remainder."
'3 240 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Tex. Civ. Aop. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 151 Tex. 370,
251 S.W.2d 153 (1952).
'3 Can a partial answer be made to a proper request for admission? It cannot if the
procedure for obtaining admissions of fact is limited in use to obtaining admission of a
single fact as to which there is no real dispute and which the adverse party can admit
cleanly, without qualification. 4 Moore, op. cit. supra note 122, 5 36.04.
11 245 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
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tained therein..... The trial court held that this and similar answers to
the other requests were evasive and not in keeping with rule 169.
In making its holding, the court said:
[Respondent] certainly had knowledge or the ability to acquire
knowledge of whether . . . the driver of the truck in question, was his
employee on September 30, 1950. The questions of whether the truck
involved was owned by [respondent] . . . and whether [the driver]
.. . was in the course of his employment were likewise matters about
which [respondent] . . . should have been in position to ascertain the
facts by reasonable inquiry .... [Respondent] was required to affirm
or deny the requested admissions or to 'set forth in detail the reasons'
for not so doing. Such reasons themselves may not be fickle but must
be based upon reason. To refuse to admit or deny the above requests
for the stated reason that he did 'not know of his own knowledge any-
thing about the collision' was an evasion of rather than a reply to such
request and did not comply with the rule."'
In Sanchez v. Caroland'" the court noted that rather peculiar an-
swers had been returned to requests seeking confirmation that re-
spondent's truck at the time of the accident was under the control of
one of his employees, acting in the course of employment. Respond-
ent's curious response was that he could not "truthfully either admit
or deny" because the request was too general, a "fishing expedition,"
and that no connection was shown between respondent and either
52s Id. at 314. Other requests for admissions and respondent's answers were:
2. That on September 30, 1950 [respondent] . . . owned a truck which was
involved in a collision with an automobile driven by [movant] ...
2. [Respondent] . . . alleges that he cannot truthfully either admit or deny
the matters contained in Paragraph 2 of said request for the reason that he
does not know of his own knowledge anything about any collision with an
automobile driven by [movant] ...
4. That at the time of the collision between [respondent's] . . . truck and
the car driven by [movant] . . . on September 30, 1950, [respondent's driver]
. . . was an agent or employee of [respondent] ...
4. [Respondent] . . . cannot truthfully admit or deny the matters contained
in paragraph 4 of said request for the reason that he does not know of his
own knowledge anything about a collision between any of his trucks and
a car driven by [movant] . . . on September 30, 1950, and therefore he
cannot swear to the statements and admissions shown in paragraph 4.
5. That at the time referred to in question 4 [respondent's driver] . . .
was acting within the scope of his agency or employment to [respondent] ....
5. (Answer quoted in text.) Ibid.
'
2 5 Id. at 315.
140274 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). Respondent's answer was:
[H]e cannot truthfully either admit or deny . . . because the facts to date
do not disclose any relationship between [respondent] . . . and the unnamed
driver of said truck. That this request . . . is not specific enough to identify
the driver with whom the relationship of the agent or employee is inquired
about and the said request for admissions must be specific so that [respondent]
. . . can intelligently comply with said request for admissions and should not
be a "fishing expedition." That as previously stated in this answer ... there are
no facts to date, showing the presence of [respondent] . . . at said scene of
said accident. Id. at 116.
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the truck driver or the scene of the accident. The court held, "if a
trial court is not free to treat this character of answer as an admission
of the facts sought to be admitted, the purposes of Rule 169 would
be defeated," and concluded with the aphorism, "a response should
be candid. 14'
c. Distinction Between Matters of Law and Fact.-Rule 169 pro-
vides for the demand for admissions of matters of fact. There is no
authority for a demand of an admission of matters of law.'42
Matters of fact ordinarily denote what was done, the events that
occurred and the conditions that existed prior to institution of the
proceeding, while a matter of law generally signifies the rules by
which acts, events, writing and conditions are tested.'43 Questions for
determination by the jury are proper subjects for requests for ad-
missions, while questions for determination by the court are normally
not.
This fundamental is graphically demonstrated in Caddo Grocery
e Ice v. Carpenter.'44 Respondent was asked if he was "engaged in
the business of the manufacturing of or making and selling sand-
wiches." His response recited that the request was made under rule
169 and that, accordingly, he "is not required to answer the request
that involves questions of law and that said interrogatory No. 3
involves a question of law and that for this reason this defendant
neither admits nor denies said interrogatory." The court, in adjudg-
ing this request as admitted, reasoned that the requests in question
were not demands for admissions of matter of law. Certainly re-
spondent "knew whether he himself or someone acting for him and
with his authority manufactured sandwiches under the names in-
quired about, whether he authorized their sale to Caddo or whether
he sold them himself, and also whether they were sold for human
consumption."' 4 Respondent had sufficient knowledge or could read-
ily obtain information to enable him to admit or deny the request.
Response that the request is a question of law standing alone is
not in conformity with rule 169.'"
In Kansas City Title Insurance Company v. Atlas Life Insurance
Company"7 the requests sought admission that respondent had an
agent and representative in Dallas County from 1954 to 1959. Re-
141 Ibid.
14 Hester v. Weaver, 252 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref.
"' 27 Tex. Jur., Law and Fact § 2, at 409-10 (1933).
'44285 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
14 Id. at 473-74.





spondent in its narrative answer recounted that it was an underwriter
of title insurance and that persons issuing such policies operated
under a contract of limited authority. Standing alone, neither re-
spondent's opinion that the question cannot be answered yes or no,
nor his conclusion that the question calls for an answer of law and
fact, constitutes an acceptable reply under the rule. To be within
the rule a response other than an admission or denial must detail why
the respondent cannot truthfully admit or deny.
B. Judicial Enforcement Powers
FRCP 36 was initially intended to operate extrajudicially with the
parties admitting or denying at their pleasure. The only sanction for
improper denial was the taxing of expenses incurred in proving the
matter at trial.'4' Through amendment and interpretation, it is now
well established that both FRCP 36 and its Texas counterpart, rule
169, although self-executing in their inception, are subject to judicial
control on hearing of respondent's objections or of movant's requests
that certain answers be deemed admissions.
No method of objecting to requests is provided in rule 169, al-
though specific provision therefor was added by amendment"" to its
counterpart, FRCP 36. Texas courts have held that if respondent
desires to avoid making the admission requested, he must within the
designated time for answer serve written objections and notice of
their early hearing. Objection may be made on the ground that some
or all of the requested admissions are (i) privileged, (ii) irrelevant,
or (iii) otherwise improper in whole or in part. It seems clear that
under rule 169 the trial court has discretion as to the time for hearing
and ruling upon such objections, as well as related matters."' Such
objections ideally would be considered at pretrial5 ' but in practice
are usually resolved when offered as evidence."'
The most common sanction for failure to answer a proper request
is to deem the matter in question admitted."4 Persuasive argument
for the additional sanction of compelling proper answer to requests
for admissions is that:
142A Barron and Holtzoff-Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 837, at 520
(1961).
149 Id. § 831.
.. Sanders v. Harder, 148 Tex. 593, 227 S.W.2d 206 (1950).
151Masterson, supra note 120, at 124.
.. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166. Thode, The Case for Pre-trial Conferences in Texas, 35 Texas
L. Rev. 372 (1957).
'5 Masterson, supra note 120, at 124.
154 Tex. R. Civ. P. 169, 170(a). See also Montgomery v. Gibbens, 245 S.W.2d 311 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1951).
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[I]t is the party requesting admissions who often seeks an additional
judicial remedy in the form of an order to compel further answers.
Nothing in the rules expressly authorizes the court to make such an
order, but it is difficult to see why it should not be able to do so. If
the only sanction for disobedience of an order compelling more adequate
answers was to deem the request admitted, as the court could have done
initially, the effect of such an order would be merely to give the
answering party a second chance to comply with the rule. Although
such a procedure would further inject the court into the operation of
Rule 36, it seems only reasonable, in view of the recipient party's right
to object to the requests and the court's reluctance to penalize him for
not answering, to give the requesting party this additional means of
obtaining a proper admission or denial. 5
Rule 170(c) provides for taxing reasonable expenses incurred by
a false denial against the offending party. There is only one reported
Texas case assessing expenses against a recalcitrant party," but there
are several federal decisions which have granted very adequate
awards."7
In Garrison v. Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc."' respondent in good
faith denied one request for admissions. Later, but still eighteen
months before trial, he notified movant that his previous denial had
been a mistake. Neither attorney's fees nor costs were allowed under
FRCP 37 (c).
Rule 170(c) is the only sanction available should a party im-
properly deny a fact under the provisions of rule 169.2"
V. IMPROVEMENT OF TEXAS DISCOVERY PROCEDURES
A. The Current Rules
1. Motion to Produce By judicious application of the varied and
rather severe sanctions available, should a rule 167 order be violated,
a firm and fair judge can successfully enforce proper discovery.
"' Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 969 (1961).
.. Mims v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 362 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
.. Akins v. McKnight, 13 F.R.D. 9 (N.D. Ohio 1952); expenses of $3,500 were taxed
to the party improperly denying the request rather than taxing all the parties of whom re-
quests were made. In making its holding the court reasoned:
[Movant] seeks to impose liability for any expenses allowed, upon counsel
for plaintiff and the corporate plaintiff, as well as upon plaintiff Akins, who
alone denied the requests.
Rule 37(c) provides for the assessment of expenses in a proper case only
against a person serving sworn denials. The sanction of the Rule is a drastic one
and should not be extended beyond its terms. Accordingly, only plaintiff
Akins will be held liable for the present expenses. Id. at 11.
...226 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1955).




In Personal Injury Litigation in Texas' ° these sanctions are enu-
merated as follows:
(a) Order the matters to be taken as established in accordance with
the claim of the party obtaining the order.
(b) Deny the refusing party the right to support or oppose desig-
nated claims and excluding certain testimony.
(c) Strike pleadings or parts thereof, or stay further proceedings
until the order is obeyed, dismiss the action or render a default judg-
ment.
(d) Assess reasonable expenses incurred in making proof where the
disobedient party should have admitted the same, such reasonable ex-
penses to include reasonable attorney's fees.
(e) Make any other orders in regard to the refusal that appear to
be just.
These penalties carry a punch. They are much more likely to secure
compliance from a recalcitrant party than would the contempt pen-
alty alone." '
2. Interrogatories The court has power to pass on objections and
undoubtedly can make appropriate orders under rule 168. Beyond
this limited power, a trial court is currently powerless to enforce
discovery under rule 168."2 Rule 215a sanctions perhaps can be
stretched to apply, although this seems unwarranted.'3
3. Request for Admissions Indications are that the available sanc-
tions under this discovery procedure are seldom enforced by trial
judges. As noted earlier, Mims v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance
Company' 4 is the only reported Texas case where the rebelling party
was taxed for expenses, and even there the action was by the appel-
late court, not the trial court.
B. Suggested Amendments
Procedural rules are the tools of the legal profession; their better-
ment leads to a more effective and efficient end product-justice.
Former Attorney General Cummings pointed out the legal profes-
sion's proclivity to procrastination and resistence to change:
[T]he public will not indefinitely entrust to the legal profession
those functions which the legal profession does not effectively dis-
charge. If our laws and our legal machinery become antiquated and
unserviceable, we, as lawyers, must set our own house in order or
confess judgment in the face of the charges which have been made
against us."'
... Johnson, Discovery by Plaintiff, Personal Injury Litigation in Texas § 4.6(10) (1961).
161 Ibid.
12 See text accompanying notes 107-108 supra.
163 See text accompanying notes 109-113 supra.
'"Mims v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 362 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
1s Cummings, 40 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 96 (1956).
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The sources of the Texas pretrial procedure rules discussed in this
paper are FRCP 33, 34 and 36.66 At the time of the adoption of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Robert W. Stayton candidly
observed that when procedural rules are adopted which depart from
the federal rules an explanation is in order. "The federal rules were
the subject of such great care at the hands of so able a committee
and give promise of so widespread an adoption that it would seem
almost an eccentricity to depart from them at all and disappoint the
hope of the profession as a whole that they would be the pattern of
a nationwide reform. '67 Texas did not adopt the federal rules ver-
batim, nor have all the intervening amendments thereto been adopted.
The ideal policy would be adoption of the federal rules unless some
reason peculiar to Texas practice dictates departure.
The demonstrated willingness of the Texas Supreme Court to
change and modify the rules as deficiencies are noted is their strength
and promise for the future. '68
1. Motion to Produce The 1957 amendment of rule 167, based on
FRCP 34, as amended, added to the similarity of those rules.6 ' Sub-
sequently, the motion to produce has functioned smoothly, but re-
vision seems warranted to improve its usefulness.
Unshackling the motion to produce, by eliminating the pre-
requisite of showing the court good cause and relevancy, is long
overdue. These requirements represent the antithesis of the pretrial
discovery policy, embodied in the interrogatory and admissions pro-
cedures, that routine extrajudicial discovery should be available as a
matter of right. The discoverability of such material would remain
the same,' the only innovation being a shifting of the burden to
the answering party to invoke the court's control, if required."
Presently, every motion to produce involves an already overextended
court. This is not the case under the companion discovery procedures
where there is judicial intervention only in the event of contest. A
study of the application of FRCP 3417' revealed that sixty per cent
of the motions are granted and in addition that the opposing parties
acquiesce in a number of other instances even though they are not
1'See text accompanying notes 20-25 supra.
167 Stayton, The Scope and Function of Pleading Under the New Federal and Texas Rules:
A Comparison, 20 Texas L. Rev. 16 (1941).
16 Thode, Some Reflections on the 1957 Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure Pertaining to Witnesses at Trial, Depositions, and Discovery, 37 Texas L. Rev. 33
(1958).
169 See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
170 Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 967 (1961).
17 Ibid.




required to do so. These figures73 indicate that a shifting of the
burden to the answering party would relieve the court in a majority
of motions to produce. This should result in a corresponding saving
of time for both counsel, who would be freed of court appearances
except in contested matters.
2. Interrogatories The major distinction between rule 168 and its
source, FRCP 33, is the availability of the answers to interrogatories
as evidence. Rule 168 provides that answers may be used only against
the party answering, while under the federal rule, answers may be
used against any party to the same extent as a deposition."' In view
of the requirement that copies of the interrogatories and any answers
must be served on all other parties 7 ' the purpose for this limitation
remains obscure. The utility of the interrogatory procedure is ma-
terially diminished, often requiring the use of other discovery pro-
cedures to insure the availability of interrogatory answers as evidence
at the trial. Consideration should be given to allowing use of inter-
rogatory answers to the same extent as depositions may be utilized.
Interrogatories frequently are not answered within the required
period of fifteen days.' Extension of the answering period to thirty
days and of the objection period, which seems needlessly compressed,
to twenty days has been suggested77 as better serving the ends of
proper answers. This should also eliminate the all too frequent time-
acquiring objection.
Insuring that interrogatory answers are current at the time of
trial is a major problem under both the Texas and federal practices.
The movant may include an interrogatory or statement that the
questions are of a continuing nature.' At least one state'79 and one
federal district.. have provided by rule that there is a continuing
duty to assure the truth of interrogatory answers. The continuing
"7 Ibid.
Masterson, Adversary Depositions and Admissions Under Texas Practice, 10 Sw. L.J.
107, 132 (1956); compare with rule 169 limitations. Professor Masterson cited the follow-
ing example: "Suppose there is one P and two D's, or, two P's and one D? Clearly judicial
admissions made by one party are not binding on any of the other parties, and this includes
a situation where one sues or is sued in several capacities and admits in only one of them.
Krasa v. Derrico, 193 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946)."
... Rule 168, supra note 7.
176 Speck, supra note 172.
177 Developments in the Law-Discovery, supra note 170, at 963.
171 Wolf v. Dickinson, 16 F.R.D. 250, 252 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
17 N.J. Rules 4:23-12.
iS8sLocal Rule 20(f), Eastern District of Pennsylvania, requires a party to file supple-
mental answers to interrogatories which are incomplete, inaccurate, or untrue. See Smith v.
Acadia Overseas Freighters, Ltd., 120 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1953); Taggart v. Vermont
Transp. Co., 32 F.R.D. 587 (E.D. Pa. 1963), aff'd, 325 F.2d. 1022 (3d Cir. 1964); Frankel
v. Stake, 33 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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duty to assure the truth of interrogatory answers following initial
response should be provided for in rule 168.
Interrogatories have yet to reach their zenith of utility, a fact
which is equally true of discovery in general. Local experimentation
designed to make the interrogatory more useful has produced en-
couraging results. A local bar committee... formulated a series of
seventy interrogatories, for use primarily in tort actions.. and de-
signed to "reduce the amount of work required of the Judges and of
counsel in discovery within the scope of these interrogatories.""1 3
The interrogatories were tailored by the Committee in such fashion
as to elicit the maximum amount of relevant, pertinent and non-
objectionable information. We quote a few:
"5. Have you or has anyone acting in your behalf obtained from
any person or persons any report, statement, memorandum, or testi-
mony concerning the accident involved in this cause of action?
"6. If so, what is the name and last known address and present
whereabouts, if known, of each such person?
"7. If so, when, where, and by whom was each such report, state-
ment, memorandum, or testimony obtained or made?
"8. If so, where is each located?
"9. What is the name and last known address and present where-
abouts, if known, of each person whom you or anyone acting in
your behalf knows or believes to have witnessed said accident?
"10. What is the name, last known address, and present where-
abouts, if known, of each person whom you or anyone acting in your
behalf knows or believes to have any relevant knowledge of the
conditions at the scene of the accident existing prior to, at, or imme-
diately after the same?'
1 84
This series of interrogatories is presumably permissive, but its use
is "encouraged by the court's readiness to rule that non-conforming
interrogatories are objectionable."'' Such court-approved interroga-
tories should provide a degree of uniformity in interrogatory practice,
thus saving both the court's time and the time of counsel in pre-
paring and answering interrogatories." s'
3. Requests for Admissions Rule 169 would be materially improved
by revision in keeping with the 1948 amendment of FRCP 36." '
'81 Subcommittee on Federal Rules of the Committee on Civil Judicial Procedure of the
Philadelphia Bar Association; Pankola v. Texaco, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 184, 185 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
182 Developments in the Law-Discovery, supra note 170, at 960.
"'
8 Pankola v. Texaco, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 184, 185 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
1
41d. at 185-86.
"'Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 960-61 (1961).
188 Ibid.
187 3A Barron and Holtzoff-Wright, Federal Practice and Procedures § 463 (1961).
Amendments to the federal rule were offered because:
There has been considerable difference of judicial opinion as to the correct
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The adaptation of rule 168 in 1962 with substantial variance in
terminology from its source, FRCP 33, indicates that such broad
revision is improbable.
Vital changes needed in rule 169 are (1) the addition of a definite
procedure for challenging the propriety of a request for admissions,
(2) clarification that an objection to a part of a request withholds
answer only to the questioned portion, 8' and (3) clarification that
a denial should accurately reflect the party's position and fairly meet
the substance of the requested admission. 8
Provision for questioning the propriety of a request should be
added to bring rule 169 into conformity with FRCP 36 and rule
168. The latter rule provides that "within 10 days after service of
interrogatories a party may serve written objections thereto together
with a notice of hearing on the objections at the earliest practicable
time. 1.. An amendment providing a similar method of objecting
could be added to the last part of the fifth sentence of rule 169; the
following is submitted with new language emphasized:
the party to whom the request is directed delivers or causes to be
delivered to the party requesting the admission or his attorney of record
either (1) a sworn statement denying specifically the matters of which
an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he
cannot truthfully admit or deny these matters or (2) written objec-
tions on the ground that some or all of the requested admissions are
privileged or irrelevant or that the request is otherwise improper in
whole or in part, together with a notice of hearing the objections at
the earliest practicable time.9'
In order to preclude any doubt that an objection to a part of a
request does not remove the requirement for answering the remainder
of the question and to insure that an answering party's denial accur-
ately reflects his position, language from FRCP 36 following the
above-proposed objection procedure could be added to rule 169:
If written objections to a part of the request are made, the remainder
of the request shall be answered within the period designated in the
method, if any, available to secure relief from an allegedly improper request.
See Commentary, Methods of Objecting to Notice to Admit, 1942, S Fed.
Rules Serv. 835 .... The changes in clause (1) are merely of a clarifying and
conforming nature.
The first of the added last two sentences prevents an objection to a part of
a request from holding up the answer, if any, to the remainder .... The
last sentence strengthens the rule by making the denial accurately reflect the
party's position ....
xs See text accompanying notes 190-192 infra.
l 89Tex. R. Civ. P. Ann. 523 (1955).
'Rule 168, supra note 7.
" Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 (1958).
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request. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested ad-
mission, and when good faith requires that a party deny only a part
or a qualification of a matter of which an admission is requested, he
shall specify so much of it as is true and deny only the remainder."'
4. Rule 170--Sanctions for Noncompliance with Discovery The
sanction rule should be amended to establish one set of broad sanc-
tions so the trial judiciary will have an appropriate penalty readily
available for any infraction of pretrial discovery. Such a broad new
sanction is proposed as rule 170 in the Appendix.
Rule 170,' adapted from FRCP 37, at present contains sanctions
to enforce discovery under rule 167, "Motion to Produce," and rule
169, "Request for Admissions." Apparently through oversight, sanc-
tions for non-compliance with rule 168 were omitted."' The motion-
to-produce sanctions""s commence rule 170 and conclude with the first
sentence of paragraph (c). The remaining two sentences of paragraph
(c) of rule 170'" contain the ineffective enforcing sanctions for
rule 169.1 "
Major revision of the sanction rule to add clear, broad and flexible
enforcement provisions applicable to rules 167, 168 and 169 is
needed. Among these broad powers, the courts should be given the
additional sanction of directing the arrest of any party or agent of
a party who wilfully disobeys an enforcing order of the court; this
would be similar to the power granted under FRCP 37 (b) (2) (iv).
The courts should be granted specific power to tax expenses against
the actual rebelling party, agent or attorney. This should prove a
sobering effect on the head-strong advocate.
Finally, a section should be added providing that neither an ob-
jection to a request for discovery nor a motion that the claim of the
moving party be established shall be heard unless the moving party
has certified to the court in writing that he has been unable through
consultation with opposing counsel to resolve the question raised by
such objection or motion.'
Maximum flexibility is provided in the proposed rule. The court
is not limited to stereotyped sanctions: "the court in addition to
192 Ibid.
' Rule 170, supra note 26.
194 See text accompanying note 108 supra.
... See text accompanying notes 67-74 supra.
'N See text accompanying notes 157-159 supra.
197 Subcommittee on Interpretation of Rules of Civil Procedure, Opinion, 5 Tex. B.J. 124
(1942), 8 Tex. B.J. 3, 22 (1945). The meaning of rule 170 would be aided by separation
of the sanctions applicable to each discovery rule in a subdivision or paragraph, thereby
eliminating needless confusion.
19 See notes 278-85 infra and accompanying text.
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fine or imprisonment for contumacious disobedience, may, within
reason, use as many and as varied sanctions as are necessary to bal-
ance the scales of justice against any weight or advantage to the dis-
obedient party. '99
VI. CONCLUSION
Texas law provides three epistolary discovery devices for the
practitioner: the motion for production of documents, written inter-
rogatories to parties, and requests for admissions of fact. In general,
discovery is designed to narrow the issues, to secure known evidence
for trial use, to determine existence of evidence, and to provide an
inexpensive and effective means of achieving these purposes.
Discovery makes it possible for the court to define the actual con-
troversy by eliminating issues not seriously contested, disclosing the
relevant evidence, exposing fraudulent claims and defenses, and im-
proving the opportunities for settlement by acquainting the parties
with the values of the case. These objectives are widely applauded in
the abstract but meet with resistance in practice.
Effective discovery requires sanctions insuring compliance with
discovery efforts. Discovery procedures and their catalysts, sanctions,
should be improved, utilized and enforced in the interest of justice.
Appropriate sanctions must be added to insure answer to inter-
rogatories. The duty to assure the continuing truth of interrogatory
answers should be provided, and provision should be made to increase
the periods for answering and objecting to interrogatories to thirty
and twenty days respectively. The motion to produce should be
amended to provide for extrajudicial inception, thereby simplifying
the procedure and effecting a saving of the court's limited time.
The admissions' sanction should be strengthened and clarified in
keeping with companion pretrial procedures.
Discovery can be improved by: (1) the bar's artful drafting of
discovery procedures and candid response in meeting the substance
of the discovery, (2) the trial judiciary's fair and impartial enforce-
ment of appropriate sanctions, and (3) the Texas Supreme Court's
continued prompt amendment of pretrial procedures when experi-
ence dictates.




RULE 170. NONCOMPLIANCE WITH
DISCOVERY; CONSEQUENCES'
(a) If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party does
not comply with a request for discovery under Rules 167, 168, or
169, the proponent of the request may on reasonable notice to all
persons affected thereby apply to the court for:'
(1) any just order to compel discovery authorized by the
respective rules;'
(2) an order establishing for the purposes of the action the
claim of the party obtaining the order;
(3) an order prohibiting the disobedient party from support-
ing or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from intro-
ducing in evidence designated documents or things or items of
testimony;
(4) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or stay-
ing further proceedings until discovery is made,' or dismissing
the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a
judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(5) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
thereto, an order directing the arrest of any party or agent of a
party for disobeying any of such orders.'
(b) If the motion is granted and if the court finds that the non-
compliance was without substantial justification the court shall re-
quire the non-complying party and the attorney or party advising
the noncompliance or either of them to pay to the requesting party
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the
order, including attorney's fees. If the motion is denied and if the
court finds that the motion was made without substantial justification,
the court shall require the requesting party or the attorney advising
the motion or both of them to pay to the non-complying party or
'Proposed rule 170 is drawn from existing rule 170 and FRCP 37. Section (a) of the
proposed rule is adapted from FRCP 37(b) (2) and rule 170(a), (b) and the initial portion
of (c). In the source rules these sanctions were limited to the motion to produce.
Section (b) of the proposed rule is drawn from FRCP 37(a), (c), and (d) and the last
portion of rule 170(c). These sanctions, under the sources, were applicable to interroga-
tories and requests for admissions. See text accompanying notes 193-199 supra.
'Adapted from FRCP 37(b)(2).
'Adapted from FRCP 37(b) (2), and rule 170.
" Styling change to rule 170(b) broadens its scope to encompass the epistolary discovery
devices.
'Styling change to rule 170(c) broadens its scope to encompass the three epistolary dis-
covery devices.
aFed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) (iv).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
witness the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing
the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees."
(c) Neither an objection to a request for discovery nor a motion
that the claim of the moving party be established shall be heard unless
the moving party has certified to the court in writing that he has been
unable through consultation with opposing counsel to resolve the
question raised by such objection or motion s
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a), plus adaptations from FRCP 37(c) and (d), and rule 170(c).
Power to tax expenses against the actual rebelling party should prove a sobering effect on
the head-strong advocate.
sE.D. Pa. Civ. R. 20(d). See Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of
Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351, 396 (1960):
Courts are frequently called upon in contested discovery matters in pro-
tracted cases to hear argument directed at relatively minor objections to inter-
rogatories, motions to produce and the like. Frequently, if objecting counsel
had made known to his opponent the specific ground of his objection, a change
in the interrogatories or in the motion for production could have been agreed
upon, thus saving the court's time. Many objections, of course, must ultimately
be ruled on by the court. But by having counsel confer in advance, the chaff
of detail may be stripped away by their mutual agreement, thus leaving the
real issues for decision by the court.
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